Apologia pro Marcel Lefebvre

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Apologia pro Marcel Lefebvre

Appendix III

(This appendix originally appeared as an editorial by Jean Madiran in Itinéraires for November 1975.)

The truth is out at last: "The Second Vatican Council has no less authority and in certain respects is even more important than that of Nicea."1 So speaks the new religion. Indeed it was a logical necessity that one day it should openly avow its ambition and its arrogance. This avowal is of great significance. The council of Nicea is the first General Council. It lasted from May to June 325, it condemned the heresy of Arius; that is to say, it affirmed dogmatically the divinity of Our Lord Jesus Christ. It also promulgated the Nicene Creed, the first part of the Credo of the Mass where the Son of God is proclaimed consubstantial with the Father.2

The Second Vatican Council promulgated no infallible and irreformable teaching. It was pastoral and not dogmatic. But we have seen clearly that in reality it has become the standard practice to impart to the pastoral novelties of Vatican II as much authority and more importance than the dogmatic definitions of previous councils. Here, then, we witness this practice of conferring prestige by sleight of hand and then announcing it in formal terms in a categorically affirmative text. No matter how exalted the man whose signature adorns this text it is still inadequate to transform falsehood into truth. But it provides incontrovertible proof that this idea truly represents the thinking of the party now holding power in the Church.

Those who cherish and propagate this arrogant idea are the promoters, authors, and actors of the Second Vatican Council. It is their own work that they place on a higher level than the work of Nicea. They consider themselves to have held a more important council! They are not simply smug in their illusion; they proclaim it with an absolute assurance. After all, we know how consistent their scheming has been. Before Vatican II they announced the modest intention of holding the most important council yet to take place. Evidently, if it is more important than Nicea it must be the most important council in history!

It was only possible to entertain the idea of organizing a council of greater importance than any yet held by totally eclipsing every vestige of filial piety towards the history of the Church. It is nothing less than an abuse of power, a public fault, a scandal, to persist in this delusion after the event, confident of having succeeded, and to seek to impose this idea on others under threat of excommunication.

The pastoral novelties of Vatican II having been declared more important than the dogmatic definitions of previous councils, it follows that henceforth it is more serious to dispute the most trivial of these reforms than to reject an irreformable dogma. The conciliar reforms are so transitory that they are constantly becoming obsolete, moving along with the current, with the course of evolution. But Mgr. Lefebvre is pronounced outside the communion of the Church if he so much as questions their value. At the same time those who deny the virginal conception of Our Lord Jesus Christ, and those who teach that the Mass is no more than a simple commemoration, are still very much part of that communion. It is a novelty to define communion with the Church on such a basis. This is no longer the Catholic communion and so it is inevitable that sooner or later true Catholics must be excluded from it.

Although you are free to "re-interpret" every revealed dogma you are now obliged to venerate as beyond criticism the human novelties introduced into the government of the Church by the conciliar spirit. Is this clear?

However, criticism of the Council and its spirit is not ruled out providing it is to the effect that Vatican II was not sufficiently revolutionary, too timid in its innovations, too conservative, too attached to the apostolic tradition. On the same principle, there has been no condemnation of the new "music-hall" Masses with erotic dancers and Marxist songs as a deviation from the Mass of Pope Paul VI. Mass can be celebrated in any way at all as long as it is not according to the Roman Missal. Similarly, it is permissible to deride the Council as long as this is done in the interests of innovation, with a progressive intention. For although the Second Vatican Council is more important than the Council of Nicea, on the other hand it is less important than the "conciliar-evolution " to which it has given birth.

We must not be duped by the apparent concession which permits Nicea to retain at least as much authority as Vatican II, if not as much importance. This concession of ''as much authority," now accepted at its face value, is in itself an insulting comparison. A pastoral council does not have as much authority as a dogmatic council. To recognize it as having as much is arbitrarily to grant the same authority to a transitory reform as to an irreformable dogma. It is subversive.

But it hasn't stopped there. We have been able to see where they would like to lead us since the years 1962-1966. When the review Itinéraires declared that it accepted the decisions of the latest council "in the context and living continuity of other councils" and "in conformity with preceding councils and all the teaching of the Magisterium," it was condemned by the French hierarchy on the grounds that this constituted a "rejection" of the Council. The review Itinéraires was condemned because, not having appreciated that Vatican II wished itself to be "more important than Nicea," it presumed that Vatican II must be interpreted according to the traditional Catholic rule of conformity to previous councils. This is the opposite of what the party in power intends to impose upon us. Nothing is to be retained from previous councils and the teaching of the Magisterium beyond what can be reconciled with the process of "conciliar evolution," the offspring of Vatican II.

We cannot go along with this.

Jean Madiran


Footnotes

1. A claim made by Pope Paul VI.

2. Since the Council of Nicea the word "consubstantial" has been a touchstone of orthodoxy. It has been removed from the translation of the Creed currently in use in English-speaking countries.

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Appendix IV

Archbishop Lefebvre and Religious Liberty

Mgr. Lefebvre's opponents have accused him of rejecting the documents of Vatican II. The truth is that he signed fourteen of the sixteen documents and declined to sign two. The first of these, the Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World (Gaudium et Spes), does not directly contradict Catholic teaching but is so uncatholic in its ethos that it is hard to understand how any self-respecting bishop could have put his signature to it. A few of the deficiencies of this document can be discovered by referring to the entry Gaudium et Spes in the index of Pope John's Council.

Mgr. Lefebvre also refused to sign the Declaration on Religious Liberty (Dignitatis Humanae). In this case his objections were doctrinal. The documents of Vatican II come within the category of the Church's Ordinary Magisterium which can contain error in the case of a novelty which conflicts with previous teaching.1 The Declaration contains a number of statements which it is not easy to reconcile with traditional papal teaching and in Article 2 there are two words, "or publicly," which appear to be a direct contradiction of previous teaching.

Paul H. Hallett of the National Catholic Register is probably America's most respected and erudite Catholic lay- journalist. On 3 July 1977 he noted that:

The Declaration on Religious Liberty is not a statement of faith. Neither does it appeal to the traditional teaching of the Church on religious freedom. Hence it is not disloyalty to faith to seek a clarification of its ambiguities. Nothing is gained by pretending that they do not exist.

Mr. Hallett then went on to examine some of the unsatisfactory passages in the Declaration and concluded that "it is necessary that some things be made clearer and more in accord with tradition than they have been in the Religious Liberty Declaration." Unfortunately, the majority of Mgr Lefebvre's critics, including "conservative Catholics, have been so eager to denounce the Archbishop that they made no attempt to examine his case. Had they followed Mr. Hallett's example they would have found that there is good deal to be said in favor of the Archbishop's position, and not only on the religious liberty issue. However, strident denunciations cost far less effort than careful research.

Pope Leo XIII warned in his encyclical Libertas Humana that there are certain so-called liberties which modern society takes for granted that every man possesses as a right. This is due to the fact that Liberals have been so successful in promoting their doctrines that some of their basic tenets are now accepted as self-evident truths even by Catholics. The essence of Liberalism is that the individual human being has the right to decide for himself the norms by which he will regulate his life. He has the right to be his own arbiter as to what is right and what is wrong. He is under no obligation to subject himself to any external authority. In the Liberal sense, liberty of conscience is the right of an individual to think and believe whatever he wants, even in religion and morality; to express his views publicly and persuade others to adopt them by using word of mouth, the public press, or any other means. The only limitation to be placed upon him is that he should refrain from causing a breach of public order. This means that the state must grant equal rights to all religions.

Pope Leo XIII condemned this theory in Libertas Humana when he taught that reason itself forbids the state “to adopt a line of action which would end in godlessness - namely to treat the various religions (as they call them) alike, and to bestow upon them promiscuously equal rights and privileges." Thus, a state in which Catholicism was the religion of the overwhelming majority of the inhabitants should be a Catholic state. In such a state civil law should be based upon the law of God, religious ceremonies at state functions should be conducted in accordance with the Catholic liturgy, and the Catholic Church should be given a privileged status in such spheres as education. This is because all authority is derived from God. Pope Leo XIII wrote in lmmortale Dei:

For God alone is the true and supreme Lord of the world. Everything, without exception, must be subject to Him, and must serve Him, so that whosoever holds the right to govern holds it from one sole and single source, namely God, the Sovereign Ruler of all.

This is the teaching that forms the basis of the papal condemnation of democracy in the sense that this word is used today. The Popes have condemned democracy if by that term it is meant that those who govern do so as delegates of the people, that authority derives from the people, and that the law of the state must reflect what the majority of the people desires. According to this view, if the majority of the people wishes to permit divorce, abortion, euthanasia, or the sale of pornography, then the laws of the state must be adjusted accordingly. The teaching of the Church, as has just been shown in the quotation from lmmortale Dei, is that authority is derived from God and that those who govern do so as His delegates. The Church is not opposed to democracy in the sense that the people choose those who govern them by means of a vote based on national suffrage. The Church is not committed to any particular form of government. She will co-operate with an absolute monarch or a parliamentary democracy. What She insists upon is that those who govern, however they are chosen, exercise their authority in accordance with the law of God, which no individual and no state can possibly have a right to violate. Given that God is, as Pope Leo XIII taught, "the Sovereign Ruler of all," the idea that a breach of His law can be a right and not an abuse is nonsensical. All men are subject to the power of Jesus Christ. Commenting on this in his encyclical Quas Primas, Pope Pius XI explained:

Nor is there any difference in this matter between the individual and the family or the state; for all men, whether individually or collectively, are under the dominion of Christ. In Him is the salvation of the individual, in Him is the salvation of Society.

Given the existence of a Catholic state, there arises the question of the correct attitude of the civil authorities to minority religions. Writing in the September 1950 issue of the American Ecclesiastical Review, Mgr. George W. Shea explained:

Before another word is said on this subject, let it be noted at once that no Catholic holds or may hold that the state would be called upon to impose the Catholic faith on dissident citizens. Reverence for the individual conscience forbids this, and the very nature of religion and of the act of faith. If these be not voluntary they are nought.

It is a fundamental principle of Catholic theology that no one must ever be forced to act against his conscience either in public or private (unfortunately this principle has not always been respected in the history of the Church). It is equally true that no one must be prevented from acting in accordance with, his conscience in private (providing that no breach of the natural law is involved). Thus, for the most part, a policy of toleration towards the Jews was followed in the papal states. Jews were allowed to meet together for private worship but were not allowed to hold ceremonies in public or to proselytize among Catholics.2 This last point brings us to the crucial issue in this appendix , i. e. that it has been the consistent teaching of the Popes that a Catholic state has the right to restrict the public expression of heresy . Thus, in a Catholic state, members of a Protestant sect could not be compelled to assist at Mass but they could be prevented from holding outdoor services, putting up notices outside their places of worship designating them as such, or advertising their services. This was the case in Malta when I served there with the British Army. Protestant ministers were not so much as allowed to wear a Roman collar in the street- a ruling which even applied to military chaplains. Similarly, in a Catholic state, a Protestant could not be compelled to profess belief in transubstantiation but could be prevented from attacking the doctrine in public, either by the written or the spoken word. Thus Father Francis J. Connell, C.SS.R., explained in 1949:

Hence, just as the state can prohibit people from preaching the doctrine of free love, so it can prohibit them from preaching, to the detriment of Catholic citizens, the doctrine that Christ is not present in the Holy Eucharist.3

Father Connell also pointed out that although Catholic states had the right to repress heresy this was not a duty. Where a large minority religion existed within a Catholic state more harm than good might result from attempting to limit the public expression of heresy. In such cases heresy would be tolerated as the lesser of two evils, e. g. to avoid the type of civil war which occurred in attempting to suppress Protestantism in France. However, the distinction between what is tolerated and what is a right is both obvious and important.

To sum up, the consensus of papal teaching is that a Catholic state has the right but not the obligation to restrict the public expression of heresy. Where repression would cause more harm than good, toleration is the better policy. The criterion which Catholic rulers must use in deciding their policy towards religious minorities is the common good. The purpose of civil society is to promote the common temporal good of its citizens-that is, the good of its citizens in the present life. But in view of the elevation of man to the supernatural life the common good must take account of man's supernatural destiny. Hence, a Catholic government must do all in its power to assist its citizens to observe the supernatural law of Christ. This can include measures to protect them from exposure to heresy or immorality. Liberals claim that any citizen has the right to propagate his views by any outlet of the media providing this does not result in a breach of public order. Paul Hallett noted that this can have too restricted a meaning. In his article of 3 July 1977 he noted:

It could and should include protection against anything that seriously threatens the welfare of the people. Thus a truly Christian state would repress the televising of a play denying the divinity of Christ, even though no palpable disturbance resulted.

In his encyclical of 1864, Quanta Cura, Pius IX reprimanded those who, "contrary to the teaching of Holy Scripture and the Fathers, deliberately affirm that the best form of government is that in which no obligation is recognized in the civil power to punish, with specific penalties, the violators of the Catholic religion, save insofar as the public peace demands."

There are few Catholic countries today in which any attempt to restrict the public expression of heresy would not do more harm than good but this does not change the fact that a Catholic government has the right to take such action where the common good demands it. Father Connell writes:

But it is fully within their [civil rulers] right to restrict and to prevent public functions and activities of false religions which are likely to be detrimental to the spiritual welfare of the Catholic citizens or insulting to the true religion of Christ. Nowadays, it is true, greater evils would often follow such a course of action than would ensue if complete tolerance were granted; but the principle is immutable.4 

The Church has frequently been accused of observing double standards by claiming the same rights as other religions in such countries as the U.S. A. where She is in a minority and demanding a privileged status in such countries as Malta or Spain where She is in the majority. Even those who do not accept Her claim to be the One True Church should at least be able to see that, in virtue of this claim, Her attitude is consistent and is based upon the rights of truth. Pope Pius XII taught in his discourse Ecco che gia un anno, of 6 October 1946, that

The Catholic Church, as we have already said, is a perfect society and has as its foundation the truth of Faith infallibly revealed by God. For this reason, that which is opposed to this truth is, necessarily, an error, and the same rights which are objectively recognized for truth cannot be afforded to error. In this manner, liberty of thought and liberty of conscience have their essential limits in the truthfulness of God in Revelation.

This principle that "error has no rights" has been attacked by Liberals, Father John Courtney Murray in particular, on the grounds that error is an abstraction and hence cannot have rights. It was claimed that as only persons or institutions could have rights the formula "error has no rights is meaningless." This argument is not simply specious, it is silly. Father Connell demolished it in an article in the American Ecclesiastical Review in 1964:

Some have tried to argue that while error has no rights, persons inculpably holding erroneous doctrines have the right to hold them. But it must be borne in mind that error can be believed, spread, and activated only by persons and so it is difficult to see what it would mean to say "error has no right to be spread" if one held at the same time "persons can have a right to spread error"- that is if "right" be taken in the same sense in both statements. ...How can one have a genuine right to believe, spread, or practice what is objectively false or morally wrong? For a genuine right is based on what is objectively true and good.5

Such authors as Mgr. Shea and Father Connell faithfully reflect the teaching of the Popes who have condemned in the most forceful terms the belief that the state has no right to repress public heresy and that truth and error should be accorded equal right. Pope Pius VII termed it "disastrous and ever-to-be deplored heresy" (letter to Mgr. de Boulogne); Pope Gregory XVI condemned it as "the insanity" (Mirari Vos); Pope Pius IX termed it “a monstrous error” (Qui Pluribus), “most pernicious to the Catholic Church, and to the salvation of souls” (Quanta Cura), “the liberty of perdition” (Quanta Cura), something which will “corrupt the morals and minds of the people” (Syllabus of Error), something which propagates “the best of indifferentism” (Syllabus); Pope Leo XIII termed it “a public crime” (Immortale Dei), “atheism, however it may differ from its name” (Immortale Dei), “contrary to reason” (Libertas).

Obviously, the insistence of the Popes upon the rights of truth is anathema to contemporary Liberalism in which unrestricted Liberty, including the liberty to propagate error, is the supreme norm. This liberty had been proclaimed in the Masonically inspired Rights of Man of the French Revolution and was subjected to one restriction only, the demands of public order. Papal teaching on the right of a Catholic state to repress error was embarrassing to such Catholic Liberals as Father Murray who wished to make Catholicism acceptable to contemporary American society. He was, no doubt, sincere in his efforts and considered them to be for the good of the Church. His principal argument was that the teaching of the Popes which has just been cited was related to a particular period in the history of the Church and was not of permanent validity. He was answered by no less an authority than Cardinal Ottaviani in an important article which appeared in the May 1953 issue of the American Ecclesiastical Review:

The first fault of these persons consists in their failure to accept fully the arma veritatis and the teaching which the Roman Pontiffs during the past century, and particularly the reigning Pontiff Pius XII, have given to Catholics on this subject in encyclical letters, allocutions and instructions of various kinds.

To justify themselves these people assert that in the body of teaching imparted within the Church there are to be distinguished two elements, the one permanent, and the other transient. The latter is supposed to be due to the reflection of particular contemporary conditions.

Unfortunately, they carry this tactic so far as to apply it to the principles taught in pontifical documents, principles on which the teachings of the Popes have remained constant so as to make these principles a part of the patrimony of Catholic doctrine.

DIGNITATIS HUMANAE

The Declaration on Religious Liberty of the Second Vatican Council

This Declaration is one of the most important documents of the Council. The ecumenical euphoria which followed Vatican II would not have been possible without it. No substantial ecumenical progress could have been made while the Church still insisted upon the right of a Catholic state to repress the public expression of heresy.

Paul Blanshard was America's most virulent anti-Catholic polemicist in the years preceding the Council. His particular bete noire was the Church's teaching on religious liberty. The fact that he had much to say in praise of Dignitatis Humanae (which will be abbreviated DH from now on) is a damning indictment of the extent to which the traditional teaching has been compromised. Blanshard claimed that DH "marked a great advance in Catholic policy, perhaps the greatest single advance in principle during all four sessions of the Council."6 He was sufficiently perceptive to note that Article Two of the Declaration contained "the best paragraphs."7 This is also the view of Mgr. Pietro Pavan, one of the theologians who collaborated with Fr. Murray in drafting and defending the Declaration. Mgr. Pavan wrote the commentary on DH which appears in Father Vorgrimler's highly praised Commentary on the Documents of Vatican II. (This commentary is highly praised because it endorses all the standard Liberal assumptions on the merits of the Council.) Mgr. Pavan states in his commentary that: "Article 2  is undoubtedly the most important article of the Declaration."8 It could certainly be considered the most important article in any document of the Council as, until it is corrected by the Magisterium, it represents not simply a contradiction of consistently reiterated, and possibly infallible, papal teaching but an implicit repudiation of the Kingship of Christ. Article 2 reads:

This Vatican Synod declares that the human person has a right to religious freedom. This freedom means that all men are to be immune from coercion on the part of individuals or social groups and of any human power, in such wise that in matters religious no one is to be forced to act in a manner contrary to his own beliefs.

Up to this point everything can be reconciled with the traditional doctrine. Article 2 continues:

Nor is anyone to be restrained from acting in accordance with his own beliefs, whether privately…

The traditional teaching has still not been violated-but now comes the break with tradition:

…or publicly, whether alone or in association with others, within due limits.

The phrase “within due limits” could have maintained harmony with previous papal teaching had these “due limits” been specified as “the common good.” However, in conformity with the Masonic Declaration of the Right of Man the “due limits” are later specified as “public order.”

The Declaration continues:

The Synod further declares that the right to religious freedom has its foundation in the very dignity of the human person, as this dignity is known through the revealed word of God and by reason itself.

It is important to bear in mind that from the moment the words “or publicly” were used, the term “religious freedom” in this Declaration includes freedom from restraint in the external forum, subject only to the requirements of public order. The sentence just cited is, then, neither in harmony with the revealed word of God nor reason. If there is one doctrine which is taught clearly throughout the Old Testament, it is that no one has a right to express religious error in the public forum - the penalty, mandated by God, was death. Are we to believe that God commanded men to be put to death for exercising what He had established as a human right? Nor is there anything reasonable in claiming that men have a natural right to teach error in public as long as this does not result in a breach of public order. The civil laws of slander and libel make this clear.

Mgr. Pavan comments:

...the right to religious freedom must be regarded as a fundamental right of the human person or as a natural right, that is one grounded in the very nature of man, as the Declaration itself repeats several times. 9 (Emphasis in original.)

Contrast this with a statement by Father Connell:

Beyond doubt, the expression "freedom- of worship " is ordinarily understood by our non-Catholic fellow-citizens, when they advocate the "four freedoms,” in the sense that every one has a natural God-given right to accept and to practice whatever form of religion appeals to him individually. No Catholic can in conscience defend such an idea of freedom of religious worship. For, according to Catholic principles, the only religion that has a right to exist is the religion that God revealed and made obligatory on all men; hence, man has a natural and God-given freedom to embrace only the true religion. One who sincerely believes himself bound to practice some form of non-Catholic religion is in conscience obliged to do so; but this subjective obligation, based on an erroneous conscience, does not give him a genuine right. A real right is something objective based on truth. Accordingly, a Catholic may not defend freedom of religious worship to the extent of denying that a Catholic government has the right, absolutely speaking, to restrict the activities of non-Catholic denominations in order to protect the Catholic citizens from spiritual harm. 10

The Vatican II Declaration continues

This right of the human person to religious freedom is to be recognized in the constitutional law whereby society is governed. This is to become a civil right.

Contrast this with the proposition condemned by Pope Pius IX in Quanta Cura, censuring those who:

…fear not to uphold that erroneous opinion most pernicious to the Catholic Church, and to the salvation of souls, which was called by Our Predecessor, Gregory XVI (lately quoted), the insanity (deliramentum) (Encyclical 13 August 1832): namely, “that liberty of conscience and of worship is the peculiar (or inalienable right of every man, which should be proclaimed by law….”

What Fr. Connell had stated no Catholic may defend is precisely what the Declaration defends and proclaims as a right. Thus Mgr, Pavan states in his commentary that: “In the religious sphere no man may be compelled to act against his conscience; and no one may be presented from acting according to his conscience.”

It is not simply traditionalists who fail to see how the teaching of Quanta Cura and Dignitatis Humanae can be reconciled, how the latter can be said to be a development of the former. It is also very significant, in view of the important place held by Quanta Cura and the Syllabus in papal teaching on the subject of religious liberty, that neither is referred to in any of the footnotes to Dignitatis Humanae . In the many references to the teachings of “recent popes”not one of  the texts cited affirms the right to religious freedom in the external forum. The breach with the traditional teaching can be narrowed down to two words in the Latin text of Dignitatis Humanae, “et publice” (“and in public”). Among the many non-traditionalists who have admitted the difficulty of proving a legitimate development between the traditional teaching and that of Vatican II are four Council periti (experts) whose testimony is of the very highest importance-the first three being the experts most influential in drafting the text of the Declaration itself. These experts are Fr. John Courtney Murray, S. J., Mgr. Pietro Pavan, Fr. Yves Congar, 0. P., and Fr. Hans Kung.

Father Murray admitted openly that no one had been able to supply an explanation of how the teaching of Dignitatis Humanae constituted a development. He simply asserted that it was a development:

The course of the development between the Syllabus of Errors (1864) and Dignitatis Humanae Personae (1965) still remains to be explained by theologians. 11

Mgr. Pavan concedes that no previous papal teaching agrees with Dignitatis Humanae. The best he can come up with is that the teaching of some recent Popes "tended towards" it, including in this list Popes Pius XI and XII who had specifically re-affirmed the traditional position.

Mgr. Pavan writes:

...there had, of course, been a doctrinal development, but that its last phase tended towards what was said in the Council documents, if it did not actually agree with it.

Fr. Congar writes, apropos Article 2 of Dignitatis Humanae:

It cannot be denied that a text like this does materially say something different from the Syllabus of 1864, and even almost the opposite of propositions 15 and 77-9 of the document.12

An interview with Hans Kung published in the National Catholic Reporter on 21 October 1977 contained the following passage:

In recent books he has stated that while conservatives do not have the right answers, they are often asking the right questions. And Lefebvre is no exception.

"I think he is wrong, but nevertheless what he's arguing are theoretically unresolved questions. "

Lefebvre has every right to question the Council’s Declaration on Religious Freedom, Kung says, because Vatican II completely reversed Vatican I’s position without explanation.

“The Council evaporated the problem, “Kung insists, because it called into question the doctrine of infallibility…. He reminisces over the late night conversations with Father John Courtney Murray (the American who guided Council thought on religious liberty):

“The Council bishops said, ‘It’s too complicated to explain how you can go from a condemnation of religious liberty to an affirmation of it purely by the notion of progress.’ ”

For Kung the issue is still unresolved and cannot be settled without looking at permanence, continuity and the infallibility of doctrine. And to do that the bishops may well have to say that what they uttered infallibly in the 19th century or before simply does not hold in the twentieth. 

Perhaps the most damning indictment of Dignitatis Humanae is the praise it received from the virulently anti-Catholic Paul Blanshard, who described it as making “a great advance in Catholic policy, perhaps the greatest single advance in principle during all four sessions of the Council.”13

The Declaration is commended by Blanshard because:

Catholicism after centuries of delay has finally caught up at least in part to the United Nations, to Western Protestantism, to Western democracies, and to the social democratic parties of Europe in advocating what had been written into the American Constitution more than 175 years before…. The final statement on religious liberty was an important achievement. It will make the struggle for religious liberty throughout the world easier. From now on every libertarian can cite an offical Catholic pronouncement endorsing the principle of liberty.14

But Blanshard positively exults in the fact that what has taken place is not a development but a change in doctrine. Vatican II had adopted Blanshard’s position, he is pleased, but he is justifiably insistent that it can only have done this by reversing previous Catholic teaching. Having dedicated himself to opposing that teaching no one was better placed to know precisely what that teaching was. Blanshard writes with contempt of attempts to cover up a change in doctrine under the pretext of development. Such attempts are specious at the best and dishonest at the worst. Blanshard writes:

The star of the American delegation was John Courtney Murray, whose chief function was to give the pedestrian bishops the right words with which to change some ancient doctrines without admitting that they were being changed. He built verbal bridges to the modern world very effectively, and the American bishops crossed over them joyously, delighted that they could be good American democrats and Catholic scholars at the same time. Murray argued that certain teachings of past leaders of Catholicism were not applicable at the present time in their original sense, since they had been designed to meet certain historic situations, and those situations had changed. Doctrine, he alleged, could "develop," a polite way of saying that it could change without any necessary admission that it had changed.

This adroit formula for a "changeless" Church was frequently used at Vatican II by theologians who were bound by their Church's veneration for tradition, but it was not always accepted as worthy of honest men even by Jesuit leaders whose institutional past is commonly associated with such linguistic manipulation. In another connection, Father John C. Ford, S. J., of the Catholic University of America, declared after the end of the Council: "I do not consider it theologically legitimate or even decent and honest; to-contradict a doctrine and then disguise the contradiction under the rubric : growth and evolution."15

Blanshard remarked that:

I am often asked: Have you changed your opinion about the Catholic Church? The answer is "Yes," but only to the extent that the Catholic Church has changed.16

Although my treatment of this important issue has necessarily been brief, sufficient evidence should have been presented to make it clear that Paul Hallet was perfectly correct to state in his National Catholic Register article that: “Hence it is not disloyal to faith to seek a clarification of its ambiguities. Nothing is to be gained by pretending they do not exist.” It should also be clear that the many Catholics (not all of them Liberals) who sneer at Mgr. Lefebvre, and reject his criticisms of the Declaration without having the courtesy and fairness to examine them, are acting most unjustly. It requires little effort and little integrity to condemn the Archbishop unheard simply because he criticizes Vatican II. Nor does it take much courage to do so, particularly when those who attack him can be virtually certain that no opportunity will be provided in the official Catholic press for the Archbishop’s side of the case to be presented. Ironically, the Declaration of Religious Liberty is being defended by denying the Archbishop the liberty to express his views in public. In order to assist those who are fair-minded enough to study both sides of the case I have written a book on the subject of Dignitatis Humanae which should be published in 1980.

This appendix can best be concluded by quoting the final paragraph from Paul Hallett’s 3 July 1977 article.

The Religious Liberty Declaration contains many excellent statements of principle, which need to be asserted against the rampant atheism that threatens all religion. All this is to the good. But for the protection of religion and not exclusively the Catholic religion - it is necessary that some things be made clearer and more in accord with tradition than they have been in the Religious Liberty Declaration.


Footnotes

The American Ecclesiastical Review has been abbreviated as AER.

1. See the Approaches supplement, The Ordinary Magisterium of the Church Theologically Considered by Dom Paul Nau, 0. S. B.
2. See the article "Toleration" in the Catholic Encyclopedia.
3. "Discussion of Government Repression of Heresy," Proceedings 111 (March 1949), pp. 98-101.
4. AER, No.119, October 1948, p. 250.
5. AER, No.151, February 1964, p. 128.
6. Paul Blanshard on Vatican II (Beacon Press, Boston, 1966), p. 339.
7. Ibid., p. 89.
8. H. Vorgrimler, ed., Commentary on the Documents of Vatican II, IV,64.
9. Ibid., p. 65.
10. AER, No.109, October 1943, p. 255.
11.  W. Abbott, The Documents of Vatican II (America Press, 1967), p. 673.
12. Challenge to the Church (London, 1977), p. 44.
13. Blanshard, p. 339.
14. Ibid., pp. 88-89.
15. Ibid., pp. 87-880
16. Ibid., Preface.

[Stone]

Apologia pro Marcel Lefebvre
Appendix V


The Legal Background to the Erection and Alleged Suppression of the Society of St. Pius X
By the Reverend Dr. Boyd A. Cathey

The first handful of seminarians of what was to become the Society of St. Pius X did their studies in the University of Fribourg. These young men had sought out Archbishop Marcel Lefebvre, then in semi-retirement in Rome (1969), and with him as superior established a house of formation in Fribourg, with the encouragement of the bishop of the diocese, Francois Charriere (cf. Letter to Archbishop Lefebvre, 18 August 1970). Within a few months it became evident that like other Catholic universities in the years following Vatican II, Fribourg was succumbing to Modernism. The decision was taken to form a religious institute, with a proper house of studies, at Econe, in the Canton of Valais. Permission granted by Bishop Nestor Adam of Sion, Switzerland, the seminary opened its doors in October, 1970.

On 1 November 1970 the Society of St. Pius X was erected canonically in the diocese of Lausanne, Geneva, and Fribourg by Bishop Francois Charriere, under the provisions of canons 673-674, and 488: o3, o4, for a period of six years ad experimentum. The Society’s statutes specify that it is a priestly society “of common life without vows, in the tradition of the Foreign Missionaries of Paris” (cf. Statutes of the Society of St. Pius X, No. 1).

Bishop Charrière’s decree of erection approving these statutes reads as follows:

Given the encouragements expressed by Vatican Council II, in the decree Optatum totius, concerning international seminaries and the distribution of the clergy;

Given the urgent necessity for the information of zealous and generous priests conforming to the directives of the cited decree;

Confirming that the Statutes of the Priestly Society correspond to its goals:1

We, Francois Charriere, Bishop of Lausanne, Geneva, and Fribourg, the Holy Name of God invoked and all canonical prescriptions observed, decree what follows:

1. The "International Priestly Society of St. Pius X" is erected in our diocese as a "Pia Unio" (Pious Union).2

2. The seat of the Society is fixed as the Maison Saint Pie X (St. Pius X House), 50, rue de la Vignenaz, in our episcopal city of Fribourg.

3. We approve and confirm the Statutes, here joined, of the Society for a period of six years ad experimentum, which will be able to be renewed for a similar period by tacit approval; after which, the Society can be erected definitely in our diocese by the competent Roman Congregation.

We implore divine blessings on this Priestly Society , that it may attain its principal goal which is the formation of holy priests.

Done at Fribourg, in our palace.
1st November 1970, on the Feast of All Saints,

François Charrière

The activity of the new Society of St. Pius X increased rapidly during the first four years of its existence. Archbishop Lefebvre received encouragement not only from many fellow bishops throughout the world, but also from Cardinal Hildebrando Antoniutti, the Prefect of the Sacred Congregation for Religious, and from Cardinal John Wright, Prefect of the Sacred Congregation for the Clergy.

On 18 February 1971, hardly five months after Econe opened its doors, Cardinal Wright wrote Archbishop Lefebvre (translated from the Latin):

With great joy I received your letter, in which your Excellency informs me of your news and especially of the Statutes of the Priestly Society.

As Your Excellency explains, this Association, which by your action, received on 1 November 1970, the approbation of His Excellency Francois Charriere, Bishop of Fribourg, has already exceeded the frontiers of Switzerland, and several Ordinaries in different parts of the world praise and approve it. All of this and especially the wisdom of the norms which direct and govern this Association give much reason to hope for its success.

As for this Sacred Congregation, the Priestly Society will certainly be able to conform to the end proposed by the Council, for the distribution of the clergy in the world.

I am respectfully, Your Excellency,
Yours in the Lord.

J. Card. Wright, Prefect.

With all matters canonically in order before the so-called "suppression" of the Society of St. Pius X on 6 May 1975, newly ordained priests were incardinated into the diocese of Siguënza-Guadalajara, Spain (by Bishop Laureano Castans Lacoma), and St. Denis de la Reunion (by former Bishop Georges Guibert, C.S.Sp.).

When a man is tonsured, thereby becoming a cleric, he must either be incardinated in a diocese or "adscriptus" in a religious institute or a society of the common life (c. 111). The word "incardination" is used only of a diocese, and religious or those seculars who are members of a society of the common life enjoying this privilege are "adscripti" not "incardinati."

Since the suppression, priests are "adscripted" into the Society, under the provisions of canon 111. As early as 1971 Archbishop Lefebvre had been assured by Cardinal Wright that within a short time the Society of St. Pius X would enjoy the privilege of adscription into the Society.3 Moreover, it should be noted that on three occasions before the suppression priests received permission from the Sacred Congregation for Religious for adscription directly into the Society. In the opinion of noted canonists such as Father Emmanuel des Graviers and Don Salvatore di Palma this is sufficient to render the privilege of adscripting into the Society existent.

The success of the Society of St. Pius X could not continue for long without an eventual Modernist counter-attack. Thus, the French Bishops in 1974 labelled the Seminary of the Society a "wildcat" seminary ("seminaire sauvage"), an "illegal seminary." In November 1974 Rome sent an Apostolic Visitation which, ironically, only served to confirm the legality of the seminary. Why would Rome send an official Apostolic Visitation, as is normal with new seminaries, if there were no permission for it? Would it not have acted to close the seminary immediately after its foundation in 1970 if there had been some irregularity?

Following the Apostolic Visitation (November 1974), a special Commission of Cardinals was named by Pope Paul VI to "interview" Archbishop Lefebvre. Two long sessions occurred, on 13 February and 3 March 1975. His Excellency was given no transcript nor was he advised he was on trial (cfr. canons 1585: o1, o2142). The only legal document available to the Commission on which a possible suppression could be based was the favorable Apostolic Visitors' report. Yet it was decided to authorize the "suppression" of the Society of St. Pius X and its seminary based on the Archbishop's "Declaration" of 21 November 1974, which the Commission condemned as "unacceptable to us on all points" (p. 58). Bishop Pierre Mamie, who had recently succeeded Bishop Charrière as Bishop of Lausanne, Geneva, and Fribourg, was accordingly instructed.

On 6 May 1975, Bishop Mamie wrote Archbishop Lefebvre: "I retire the acts and concessions granted by my predecessor in that which concerns the Priestly Society of St. Pius X, particularly the Decree of Erection of 1 November 1970." This action was completely illegal. The Society of St. Pius X, according to its Statutes approved by Bishop Charrière, is a priestly society "of common life without vows," coming under the provisions of canons 673-674 and 488, o3,o4. As such the Society of St. Pius X could only be suppressed by the Holy See, which alone has the power to suppress such an institute erected under diocesan law (c. 493).

An appeal, protesting Bishop Mamie's illegal action, questioning the strange procedure of the Commission of three Cardinals, and challenging their competence in this matter, was lodged with the Supreme Tribunal of the Apostolic Signatura on 5 June 1975 (Letter of Archbishop Lefebvre to Dino Cardinal Staffa, 21 May 1975; this was followed by the appeal itself on 5 June). It was returned on 10 June, when the Prefect of the Signatura, the late Dino Cardinal Staffa, declared himself "incompetent," under canon 1556, to judge a decision approved in forma specifica by the Sovereign Pontiff (“Prima sedes a nemine judicatur").

A second appeal was filed by the Archbishop's advocate, Corrado Bernardini, on 14 June 1975. To prevent its reception, Jean Cardinal Villot, the Secretary of State, personally intervened to interdict any further consideration of the question! (La Condamnation sauvage de Mgr. Lefebvre, 6th Edition, August 1976, p. 55, note).

Before analyzing these events, it might be helpful to explain the meaning of a confirmation in forma specifica. Dr. Neri Capponi, Professor of Canon Law in the University of Florence, Italy, in a study on the juridical problems in post-conciliar legislation, resumes the teaching of canonists in a most important study of the juridical aspects of the post-conciliar liturgical reform:4

The two forms of pontifical confirmation of acts emanating from inferior organs of government are the confirmatio in forma communi and the confirmatio in forma specifica respectively.5 In the case of a provision in forma communi the provision confirmed, as we have seen, does not change its nature. For this reason if the inferior body has presumed to legislate ultra vires contrary to a preceding papal or conciliar law, or has sought to introduce principles contrasting with such laws, such legislation remains invalid regarding such part of it as is not in conformity with the higher legislation. But if the confirmation is in forma specifica the provision is thereby assumed by the higher authority, who makes it his own, remedying any invalidity it might have. It is presumed, in fact, in such cases that the higher authority is fully cognizant of the ultra vires element in the provision and wishes, by making it his own, to confirm it, abrogating or derogating from what had previously been laid down (p. 16).

In the case at hand, this would have involved necessarily a specific confirmation, first of all, of the illegal delegation by the Cardinals to Bishop Mamie of a power he in no way enjoyed, and secondly, of the illegal exercise of that power by Bishop Mamie. Cardinal Staffa seems to have based his written refusal to consider the appeal on this assumption (no doubt, he had other, unwritten reasons not to get involved!); "the contested act," he wrote to Mgr. Lefebvre on 10 June, "is only the execution of decisions taken by the Special Commission of three Cardinal Fathers, and approved by the Sovereign Pontiff 'in forma speciali ' " (Letter cited in Yves Montagne, L'Eveque suspens, p. 158.)

This argument, however, doesn't seem to hold up under examination. As the Archbishop's advocate made clear in his second appeal, of 14 June, "the terms of the [Cardinals'] letter of 6 May 1975, that is 'It is with the full approval of His Holiness that we notify you...' do not seem to speak of a specific approbation [that would make the act or decree a true pontifical act] but rather the customary approval which is ordinarily given by His Holiness for all decisions, whether of Congregations, of the Apostolic Signatura, or of a special Cardinals' Commission." (Note, cited in L'Eveque suspens, pp. 159-160). Professor Capponi notes that curial officials tend to presume that certain formulae indicate confirmation in forma specifica without it following that the Pope must limit himself to these and that, in a case of doubt, it is presumed that one is dealing with a confirmation in forma communi (pp. 16-17).

Moreover, it is evident here that canon 1556 is cited out of its proper context. If we question the legitimacy of the acts of an extraordinary Commission of Cardinals, we do not thereby judge the pope, even if he had approved the Commission's existence or its acts in forma specifica. Rather, we question if, in effect, the Commission executed its mandate illegitimately by violating certain canonical prescriptions. According to one standard text on canonical procedure, Lega-Bardocetti (Commentarius in judicia ecclesiastica, Rome, 1941, Vol. II, p. 981), in such an hypothesis if an appeal from a judgment bearing on the essence of a question is excluded, nevertheless appeal is admitted for questions concerning the procedure (procedendi modus respicientes) and the procedure is rendered suspect. It was precisely on the illegality of the procedure followed that Archbishop Lefebvre's first appeal was based, that is, on the violation of norms which are prescribed to prevent unjust measures.

This argument applies for a measure taken by any organ, either ordinary or extraordinary, of the Holy See and approved in forma specifica by the Pope (cfr. "Justice et injustices romaines en l'Année Sainte de la Réconciliation 1975," Courrier de Rome, 153, January 1976, pp. 1-4). It should be stated that this was not the case with the action taken by Bishop Mamie, despite the pontifical approbation given to the letter signed by the three Cardinals. His suppression and the Cardinal's letter are two different documents; even if we were to admit that the latter had the approval of Pope Paul VI, the former would still be an illegitimate usurpation of authority, in flagrant violation of canon 493, and lacking the necessary confirmation (none has ever been produced, either by Rome or by Bishop Mamie). Cardinal Staffa’s reply glaringly omits any mention of the measure taken by Bishop Mamie to “suppress” the Society of St. Pius X, and yet in strictly juridical sense, this was the only action that really mattered.

Archbishop Lefebvre also appealed, protesting that the Commission of Cardinal was not competent to judge his “Declaration” of 21 November 1974, that rather the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (former Holy Office) was “alone competent in such matters.” Equally, a judgment  of his “Declaration” could not be construed as a judgement of  the seminary, especially since the results of the Apostolic Visitation were favorable.

Finally, the personal intervention of Cardinal Villot to prevent further consideration of these questions was anything but canonical. What did the Secretary of State have to fear if justice was on his side? As it is, the multiple irregularities and the obvious failure to render justice to Archbishop Lefebvre can only lead to one conclusion: the Society of St. Pius X continues to enjoy canonical existence, the measures taken against it and its founder lack validity.6

Footnotes

1. In view of the fact that allegations have been made that Archbishop Lefebvre was never authorized to found a seminary note carefully that the Decree of Erection authorizes the establishment of a “Priestly Society” for “the formation of zealous and generous priests” in an “international seminary.”

2.The Bishop’s use of the expression “pia unio” here is a little confusing. A “pia unio,” as canon 707-708 make clear, is not normally a moral person. It means a lay association. A religious “society of the common life,” as the approved statutes of the Society of St. Pius X specify it is, described in canon 673, is really very much like a religious institute but without public vows. It is possible that Bishop Charriere intended here “pia domus” since it is quite normal to erect a “pia domus” as the first step towards a new religious institute.

3. Cf. Letter to Archbishop Lefebvre, 15 May 1971.

4. Some Juridical Considerations on the Reform of the Liturgy. This invaluable study is available from the Angelus Press but readers are warned that it is of a technical nature and would not make easy reading for those unacquainted with Canon Law. It proves conclusively that no legal prohibition exists to prevent any priest celebrating the traditional Mass at any time.

5. See p. 114 for an explantion of these terms.

6. FOOTNOTE BY MICHAEL DAVIES. An alternative view to that of Father Cathey can be found in the extract from the Cambridge Review cited on p. 125. As Father Cathey explains in the citation from Professor Capponi, subsequent papal approval in forma specfica can remedy an existing invalidity .Pope Paul gave such approval in his letter of 29 June (p. 113) and the Cambridge Review concluded that this approval was valid in law although “illicit in its violation of natural justice.” Thus, even if Fr. Cathey’s conclusion is disputed and the Society has been legally suppressed the Archbishop’s refusal to submit can be justified on the grounds that natural justice has been violated (see pp. 121-124 and Appendix II).